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This paper examines the effects of robotization on trade patterns, wages and welfare. It develops
a Ricardian model with two-stage production and trade in intermediate and final goods in which
robots can take over some tasks previously performed by humans in a subset of industries. An
increase in robot adoption in the North reduces the cost of production and thereby impacts trade
in final and intermediate goods with the South. The empirical analysis uses ordinary least squares
and instrumental-variable regressions exploiting variation in exposure to robots across countries
and sectors. Both reveal that greater robot intensity in own production leads to: (i) a rise in
imports sourced from less developed countries in the same industry; and (ii) an even stronger
increase in exports to those countries. Counterfactual simulations indicate that Northern roboti-
zation raises domestic welfare, but initially depresses wages. However, this adverse effect is likely
to be reversed by further reductions in robot prices. Northern robotization may lead to higher
wages and welfare in the South.
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chains, gains from trade
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1 Introduction
Recent and prospective advances in automation, robotics and artificial intelligence have renewed
concerns about the potential disruptive impacts of technological change on labor markets (Bryn-
jolfsson and McAfee, 2014; Ford, 2015). Modern industrial robots can be programmed to perform
a variety of repetitive tasks with consistent precision, and are increasingly used in a wide range
of industries and applications.1 A growing body of evidence reveals that their adoption has had
important implications for productivity and labor markets in high-income countries. Exploiting
variation in robot usage across industries and countries, Graetz and Michaels (2018) find that
increased robot density raised productivity and wages, but reduced the employment share of low-
skilled workers. Focusing on local labor markets in the United States, Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2017b) document large and robust negative effects of robots on employment and wages across
commuting zones.2
So far, the adoption of industrial robots has been largely confined to a relatively small number
of high-income nations. Yet this does not necessarily mean that poorer countries have remained
insulated from their impacts. In an integrated global economy, the adoption of industrial robots
in high-income nations might have important implications for relative production costs and in-
ternational specialization. If tasks that were commonly performed by low-skill workers in the
South can now be executed by relatively inexpensive robots at home, the scope for North-South
trade might be reduced. By potentially shutting developing countries out of global value chains,
robotization might adversely impact wages and welfare, even in nations that have not yet adopted
this technology (Rodrik, 2018).
In this paper, we examine the implications of industrial robotization for North-South trade,
wages and welfare. We first develop a Ricardian trade theory with two-stage production in which
robots can take over some tasks previously performed by humans, building on Eaton and Kortum
(2002), Artuc and McLaren (2015), Caliendo and Parro (2015) and Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2017b). In the model, a subset of tasks required in the production of intermediate and final goods
can be executed either by workers or robots, while other tasks can only be performed by humans.
1Robots are therefore different from other types of industrial machinery which can only be used to perform a
specific application in a specific sector.
2Other recent contributions on the drivers and impacts of automation include Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017a,
2018a,b,c). A related strand of earlier work examines impacts of other technologies on wage inequality, jobs and
employment polarization, including widely cited papers by Feenstra and Hanson (1999), Autor, Levy, and Murname
(2003), Goos and Manning (2007), Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenen (2007), Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2015) and
Akerman, Gaarder, and Mogstad (2015). Costinot and Werning (2018) offer a theoretical analysis of how tax policy
can optimally be used to address the distributional impacts of technological change.
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The range of tasks that may be performed by robots varies across sectors. The industry-specific
robotization frontier, relative factor prices and productivity determine the extent of robot use
within sectors. Production of each final good variety further requires a composite intermediate
good from the same industry. In equilibrium, varieties of intermediate inputs and final goods
are sourced from the country that supplies at the lowest price. Thus, there are two layers of
competition: (1) between robots and workers in factor markets; and (2) between countries in
sector-specific product markets for inputs and outputs. Relative production costs (driven by
factor prices and technology) determine country-specific robotization and trade patterns.
A fall in the price of industrial robots initially induces robotization in the North, where the
cost of labor is relatively higher to begin with. This shift impacts relative production costs
between countries, and therefore trade patterns. Robots replace domestic labor within sectors,
leading to lower costs of production in the North, and hence to an increase in exports to the
South. The effect of Northern robotization on imports sourced from the South in the same
sector is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, robotization makes Northern producers more
competitive, which implies that some varieties that were previously imported from the South are
now sourced domestically. On the other hand, robotization leads to an expansion in the scale of
production, which raises the demand for inputs sourced from the South.
Simple OLS regressions using country-industry panel data on trade and industrial robots over
the last two decades—including country-pair-year and industry-year fixed effects—point to a ro-
bust positive relationship between robot intensity in own production and imports sourced from
less developed countries. They also reveal an even stronger association with exports to these
countries. Robotization thus leads to a significant reduction in net imports from less developed
countries within the same sector. However, there are reasons to be concerned that these relation-
ships reflect various forms of endogeneity. Robotization may in part be a response to changing
trade patterns—for instance, trade may alter the incentives of Northern producers to automate
their production. To address this possibility, as well as biases associated with omitted variables
and measurement error, we implement an instrumental variable strategy motivated by our the-
ory, exploiting variation in the exposure to robotization across countries and sectors. Specifically,
we use the triple interaction between pre-determined country-wide labor costs (which govern the
incentives to robotize), the share of workers engaged in replaceable tasks in the industry (as a
proxy for the feasibility of automation), and the global stock of robots (as a proxy for the price
of robots) as instrument for robotization at the country-industry-year level. As an alternative
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IV strategy, we also present regressions in which we use sector-specific robotization trends in
countries with similar income levels as an instrument for own robotization. In both cases, the IV
results point to an even stronger effect of robot adoption on trade. According to our preferred
IV estimates, a 10% increase in robot density in Northern countries is associated with a 6.1%
increase in their imports from less developed countries and an 11.8% increase in their exports
to these countries, such that net sectoral imports from the South decline by 5.7%. In line with
the key mechanisms emphasized by our theory, the positive impact of Northern robotization on
imports from the South is mainly driven by exchanges of parts and components.
Armed with these reduced-form partial equilibrium estimates, we return to the theoretical
model to study quantitatively the general equilibrium effects of reductions in robot prices on wages
and welfare in the North and the South, using counterfactual simulations. We find that, as robots
become cheaper, they replace Northern workers in a wider range of tasks. Displaced workers must
seek employment in other sectors of the economy. While overall production expands, aggregate
labor demand falls during this process, depressing Northern wages. Robotization nevertheless
leads to domestic welfare gains, as the income losses associated with lower labor income are more
than compensated for by productivity gains, lower consumer prices, and increased income from
the rental rate of robots. Interestingly, the quantified model points to an important non-linearity
in the relationship between wages and robot prices. As robot adoption deepens in the North,
production in the robotized sector continues to expand, thus raising demand for the tasks in which
robotization is technologically unfeasible. As we move closer to the robotization frontier, this effect
fully offsets the direct negative impact of robotization on sectoral labor demand. Eventually, the
share of labor in the robotized sector starts to expand, thereby raising overall labor demand and
leading to higher wages in the North.
Even if production in the South is not subject to robotization, Southern wages and welfare
are impacted by robot-induced shifts in international specialization. While robotization makes
Northern producers more competitive, it also raises demand for Southern inputs. Because of this
increase in demand and lower consumer prices, aggregate welfare is likely to increase in the South.
Welfare gains in the South are likely to be even more pronounced if robotization also becomes
feasible there. Since trade in intermediate and final goods is the main channel by which Northern
robotization impacts welfare in the South, the importance of this channel would be even greater
if trade costs were lower.
In addition to the articles mentioned above, this paper adds to a growing literature that
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builds on Eaton and Kortum (2002) to examine the implications of different aspects of globaliza-
tion for welfare and income distribution, including influential contributions by Yi (2003), Dekle,
Eaton, and Kortum (2008), Chor (2010), Waugh (2010), Fieler (2011), Arkolakis, Costinot, and
Rodriguez-Clare (2012), Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2013), Caliendo and Parro (2015), Don-
aldson (2018) and Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro (forthcoming).3 Most closely related to this
paper, Parro (2012) and Burstein, Cravino, and Vogel (2013) quantify multi-sector variants of
Eaton and Kortum (2002) to study the impact of trade in capital equipment on the skill pre-
mium. In contrast to this body of work, we focus on the effects of robotization on trade patterns,
wages and welfare for a given level of trade costs, and we use the model to empirically estimate
the causal effects of robots on North-South trade. In addition, we emphasize non-linearities in
the degree of substitutability between robots and workers, depending on the range of tasks in
which robots have replaced humans and the distance to the robotization frontier. Acemoglu and
Restrepo (2017b) explore links between robots and trade across US commuting zones in the con-
text of an extended Armington (1969) model. But, unlike us, they do not focus on the interplay
between robots and North-South trade driven by input-output linkages and comparative advan-
tage, do not estimate causal effects of robots on trade flows, and do not explore quantitatively
how further advances in robotization are expected to impact international specialization, wages
and welfare in the North and the South.
More generally, our paper contributes to a broader literature focusing on links between in-
ternational trade and technology, including contributions by Freund and Weinhold (2004), Ver-
hoogen (2008), Lileeva and Trefler (2010), Bustos (2011), Bøler, Moxnes, and Ulltveit-Moe (2015),
Burstein, Morales, and Vogel (2016), Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016), Burstein and Vogel
(2017), Atkin, Khandelwal, and Osman (2017), Fort (2017), Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Pisano, and
Shu (2017), Bastos, Silva, and Verhoogen (2018), Bastos, Dias, and Timoshenko (2018) and Ak-
cigit, Ates, and Impullitti (2018). This paper focuses on robots because this is a technology for
which internationally and temporally comparable data are available, but the patterns we uncover
are likely to generalize to a wider class of capital goods that can replace labor (e.g. software and
other machines). Industrial robots are perhaps distinctive, however, in being able to perform a
rather wide range of tasks with only very limited human supervision.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework
and derives implications for empirical work. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy for examin-
3See Eaton and Kortum (2012) for a survey of this literature.
4
ing the causal impacts of robots on trade between developed and developing countries. Section 4
describes the data employed in the empirical analysis, before Section 5 presents the econometric
results. Section 6 uses our quantitative model to examine general equilibrium effects of further
reductions in robot prices on North-South trade patterns, wages and welfare. Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2 A Ricardian theory of robots, tasks and trade
We develop a multi-sector, multi-country Ricardian model with two-stage production and trade in
intermediate and final goods in which robots can replace labor in a subset of industries. The model
builds on Eaton and Kortum (2002), Caliendo and Parro (2015), Artuc and McLaren (2015) and
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017b). We denote countries by m and n and sectors by i. We denote
production stages by s, where s = 1 refers to intermediate inputs (first stage) and s = 2 refers
to final goods (second stage).4 All markets are perfectly competitive. Workers can move freely
across stages and sectors but are immobile across countries. Robots are equally available in all
countries, at the same (exogenous) rental rate. They are owned by residents of the country that
robotizes production.
2.1 Preferences
The representative household in country m maximizes utility by consuming a composite of final








where Qm,i2 is the amount of composite final good from sector i demanded by consumers in
country m and γm,i is a constant, with
∑
i γ
m,i = 1. The composite final good Qm,i2 results from
the aggregation of final stage varieties by consumers, as described in detail below.
4For simplicity, we assume a two-stage production process. However, as discussed below, the key mechanisms
we emphasize would also apply in a multi-stage setting. Leading trade theories with multi-stage production include
Yi (2003, 2010), Antras and Chor (2013), Antras and de Gortari (2017), Fally and Hillberry (2018) and Lee and Yi
(2018).
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2.2 Varieties and production stages
A continuum of varieties ω ∈ [0, 1] is produced in each sector i of country m. These varieties can
be produced either as intermediate inputs in the first stage or as final goods in the second stage.
We define the set of first and second stage varieties in industry i respectively as Si1 and S
i
2, such
that Si1 ∪ Si2 = [0, 1].
Production of these varieties, both in the first and second stages, requires three types of
inputs: a fixed factor specific to the industry-stage; a composite task input; and a composite first
stage output from the same industry, Qm,i1 . Thus, a set of tasks are performed on the composite
intermediate input with the help of fixed factors to produce variety ω. If ω belongs to stage one, it
is used to produce the composite intermediate input Qm,i1 ; if not, it belongs to the composite final
good Qm,i2 . Notice that composite Q
m,i
1 is only used to produce other varieties, while composite
Qm,i2 is only demanded by consumers.
The amounts of tasks and fixed factors used in the production of ω are denoted as Tm,i(ω)
and Fm,is (ω) respectively, where ω ∈ Sis. The production function of variety ω is given by the
following Cobb-Douglas technology
qm,i (ω) = zm,i(ω)
(
Fm,is (ω)
)αm,iF (Qm,i1 (ω))αm,iM (Tm,i(ω))αm,iT , (2)
where zm,i(ω) is the productivity drawn from a Frechet distribution with shape parameter θ. For
simplicity, we assume that fixed factors can be used to produce any variety ω in industry i and
stage s. Therefore, they are specific to the industry-stage but not to the variety. The production




T = 1, ∀{m, i}.
Let Pm,is denote the price of the composite good from stage s. The cost of producing zm,i(ω)












where ψm,i1 is a fixed constant, w
m,i
T is the price of the composite task input, and r
m,i
s,F is the rental
rate of fixed factors.5




3,..., etc. These multipliers
are constants which can conveniently be ignored by the reader.
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2.3 Composite intermediate and final goods
Consumers and producers demand varieties and source them both internationally and domesti-
cally. Producers in sector i and country m minimize the costs associated with input Qm,i1 by
sourcing variety ω ∈ S1 from the lowest cost suppliers across all countries.6 Similarly, consumers
demand final good varieties ω ∈ S2 from the lowest cost suppliers across all countries.












where σ > 0 and qm,i(ω) is the demand from the lowest cost supplier across countries.







where unit price of the composite stage s good is Pm,is .








where τm,n,i denotes trade costs between origin n and destination m.


















From (7) it is clear that the price of this composite good is positively associated with trade
costs, factor prices and the price of the intermediate composite in the supplier country.
6As is standard in trade models, only varieties are traded. Composite intermediate goods are produced using
varieties that can be sourced domestically or internationally.
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2.4 Robots and tasks
The production of composite task input for variety ω requires performing tasks k ∈ [0, 1]. We
assume that tasks from 0 to Ki can be performed by robots or humans, while tasks between Ki
and 1 can only be performed by workers. In some industries, robotization is not feasible, and
hence ∃i : Ki = 0. The subset of tasks that can be robotized is thus given by Ki, while the
subset of tasks that cannot be robotized is given by 1 − Ki. We denote the automatable tasks
with TA and non-automatable tasks with TN . We assume that the robotization frontier and the
productivity of robots are industry specific, but not stage specific.7
We denote labor and robots with subscripts L and R respectively. In order to perform one
unit of task k of variety ω within industry i, φiLζL(k) labor units are required. If k < K
i, then
alternatively φiRζR(k) robot units can perform the same task. The wage per unit of labor is
denoted by wmL , while the rental rate of one robot unit is denoted by wR. We assume that ζR(k)
and ζL(k) are distributed Weibull with shape parameter ν.
Thanks to the distributional assumptions, the optimal set of tasks performed by robots is










where Km,iR depends only on: (i) the automation frontier, K
i, (ii) the elasticity of substitution
between robots and workers, 1 + ν; and (iii) the productivity-adjusted relative price of workers
and robots, φiLwL/φ
i




RwR > 1 for a given task
k, and employ workers otherwise. The top panel of Figure 1 displays the relationship between
these productivity-adjusted relative prices (on the vertical axis) and the set of tasks performed
by robots (on the horizontal axis). In equilibrium, the set of robotized tasks is given by Km,iR . A
decline in the rental rate of robots, wR, leads to an increase in the number of robotized tasks.









−ν)− 1ν , (9)
and depends on wages, the unit cost of robots, and the elasticity of substitution between robots
7It is straightforward to relax this assumption and make robotization stage-specific. We chose to model roboti-
zation as a stage-neutral process due to lack of information on how robots are allocated across production stages
within industries.
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where wm,iTA < w
m,i
TN
. Thus, the average cost of tasks that can be robotized is always smaller than
the average cost of tasks that cannot be robotized.














where ψi5 is a constant. The relative cost variable in (11) is equal to one if there is no robotization,
and it is minimized if robot rental rate is zero. Related to the cost reduction variable, equilibrium













where Tm,i is the total task output and Lm,i is the total labor demand in industry i of country
m.8
While Ωm,i is the price of a task relative to wages, Ξm,i is the number of workers demanded
in equilibrium to produce a unit of task. Using these two variables, it is possible to express tasks
and task prices in terms of labor and wages, and substitute out robot demand. Note that the









Equations (8), (11) and (12) show the relationship between wages, cost of tasks, labor demand
and task demand for given robot prices and robotization frontier.
A reduction in robot prices leads to a decline in the cost of production between tasks 0 and
Ki, thereby lowering the average cost of production. This cost reduction will change relative
production costs across countries. Some varieties that were previously imported can now be
8See Appendix A.2 for the definition of ψi5 and the derivation of (11) and (12).
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where Ωm,i ∈ [0, 1] is the cost reduction implied by robotization from (11), with costs reductions
decreasing in Ωm,i.9
The bottom panel in Figure 1 shows how Ωm,i and Ξm,i change as the rental rate of robots
declines. As wR decreases the average cost of performing tasks declines (i.e. Ω
m,i falls). This also
means that wages relative to the unit cost of tasks increase. However, at the same time, demand
for labor for a given number of tasks also declines (i.e. Ξm,i falls). This decline in labor demand
is faster than the decline in unit cost, which can potentially push the wages down and decrease
employment in the robotized sector. However, with lower costs, production in the robotized
industry also increases, which can raise labor demand and therefore wages. The direction and the
magnitude of the impact of robotization on sectoral employment and wages is thus theoretically
ambiguous.
2.5 Prices and international trade
















Therefore, we can now express the price of composite good as a function of wages, wnL (which
can be measured). In each country, varieties are sourced from the country that charges the lowest


















Equation (15) represents the relative demand for each country in stage s of sector i. It is
analogous to the gravity equation derived in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and others, with an
9That is, Ωm,i = 1 implies no cost reduction, while Ωm,i closer to 0 denote larger costs reductions.
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additional variable measuring the cost reduction implied by robotization, Ωm,i. We present the
equilibrium conditions and close the model in the next subsection.
2.6 Equilibrium
The value of output in country m stage s and industry i is denoted by Y m,is . Total demand for
Qm,is is given by the sum of demand by wage earners, fixed factor owners, producers and robot














Y m,js , (16)
The first-stage composite output is demanded for production of variety ω in both stages.
Because of the Cobb-Douglas structure, total demand for the first-stage composite is a share of









The expenditure of country m on country n output in industry i is given by
























Y m,n,is , (20)
and is assumed to be constant.

















where Ξm,i is a measure of labor demand, as defined in (12) and derived in Appendix A2. The






s . Since workers are perfectly
mobile, wages are equalized across sectors and production stages.






2.7 Implications of robotization for North-South trade within industries
As shown in (8), the subset of tasks subject to robotization (thus the number of robots) is inversely
related to the rental rate of robots, wR, and positively associated with wages w
m
L . A fall in the
rental rate of industrial robots initially induces robotization in more developed countries, where
the cost of labor is relatively higher to begin with. This shift influences relative production costs
across countries (Ωm,i declines more in countries with higher wages), thereby impacting trade
patterns. Robots replace domestic labor within sectors, leading to lower costs of production in
the North, and hence to an increase in exports to the South. The effect of Northern robotization on
imports sourced from the South is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, robotization makes
Northern producers more competitive, which implies that some varieties that were previously
imported from the South are now sourced domestically. On the other hand, robotization leads to
an expansion in the scale of production, which raises the demand for first-stage varieties sourced
from the South.10 Notice that robotization impacts productivity gains through both the fall in
Ωm,i and robot-induced fall in input prices, Pm,i1 .
10For simplicity, we assume a two-stage production process. However, the key mechanisms we emphasize would
also apply in a multi-stage setting. As long as the South has a comparative advantage in some intermediate stages
of production, a robot-induced expansion in Northern production would raise the demand for Southern inputs. At
the same time, the shift in relative production costs implied by robotization would reduce the demand for imports
from the South. The net effect on imports from South is generally ambiguous.
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3 Econometric method
Motivated by our theory, we now describe the econometric strategy for examining whether and
how the adoption of industrial robots in advanced economies impacted trade flows with developing
countries within industries. We adopt the following baseline econometric specification:
Tradenmit = βRobotsnit + Ψnmt + Λit + ε (23)
where Tradenmit denotes the log of (1+ exports) from developed country n to developing country
m in sector i and year t or alternatively the log of (1+imports) sourced from developed country
n in sector i and year t; Robotsnit denotes a measure of robot usage in country n in sector i
in year t; Ψnmt denotes a fixed effect by exporter-importer-year; Λit denotes an industry-year
fixed effect; and ε the error term. We include exporter-importer-year fixed effects both to allow
for pair-specific shocks (such as fluctuations in income, population and exchange rates) and to
control for country pair specific determinants of trade (e.g. distance, having a common language
etc.). We further include industry-year fixed effects to account for factors that are specific to each
industry in each year. Standard errors are clustered by developed country.
An important concern is that robotization is potentially endogenous. It may be a response to,
rather than a cause of, changing trade patterns. For example, increased trade may influence the
decisions of Northern producers to robotize their production. Indeed, existing evidence suggests
that increased trade may drive technology adoption through several channels, and in different
directions. Using data for Europe, Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen (2016) find that greater
import competition from China is associated with higher patenting, expanded investment in IT
and higher TFP. Conversely, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, Pisano, and Shu (2017) find that increased
Chinese competition led to a reduction in firm-level and technology class-level patent production
in the US; while Pierce and Schott (2018) find that US industries more exposed to increased
import competition experienced a relative decline in investment. The implications of increased
exports to the South for technology adoption are also ambiguous. Although a body of evidence
suggests that exporting has positive effects on technology adoption (Lileeva and Trefler, 2010;
Bustos, 2011; Atkin, Khandelwal, and Osman, 2017), a related strand of work suggests that such
effects may depend on the income level of export destinations. In particular, exporting to less
developed countries might lead to an expansion of less technology-intensive production lines within
firms (Verhoogen, 2008; Bastos and Silva, 2010; Bastos, Silva, and Verhoogen, 2018).
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To address this possibility of reverse causality in the relationship between robotization and
trade, as well as biases caused by omitted variables or measurement error, we adopt an instrumen-
tal variables approach. Specifically, we use the triple interaction between the (pre-determined)
share of workers engaged in replaceable tasks in each sector, the country’s initial income per capita,
and the global stock of robots as instrument for robotization. Alternatively, we use industry-level
trends in robot adoption in other countries with similar levels of income as instrument for own
robotization.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Data sources
The empirical analysis in this paper combines and examines several sources of panel data for the
period 1995-2015, which we can link through a consistent definition of industries. In this section,
we provide a brief description of each data source, while giving further details in Appendix B.1.
The stock of industrial robots by industry, country and year comes from the International
Federation of Robotics (IFR). These data are based on yearly surveys of robot suppliers, and cover
about 90 percent of the industrial robots market. The IFR measures both deliveries and stocks
of “multipurpose manipulating industrial robots” based on the definitions of the International
Organization for Standardization.11 The data are disaggregated roughly at the three-digit level for
manufacturing and roughly at the two-digit level for non-manufacturing activities. The IFR data
are regarded as the best source of information on industrial robots (Graetz and Michaels, 2018;
Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017b). Nonetheless, these data have some limitations. First, about 30
percent of industrial robots are not classified into any industry. Following Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2017b), we allocate these unclassified robots to industries in the same proportion as observed
in the classified data. Second, the IFR data do not cover “dedicated industrial robots”, which
are defined as automatically controlled machines for only one industrial application. Third, the
IFR data have incomplete coverage for a number of countries; as a result our panel is unbalanced.
We construct the robot stock for each country-sector-year using the perpetual inventory method
assuming a depreciation rate of 10%. We prefer this measure over the measure of the robots stock
11According to this definition, a machine is considered to be an industrial robot if it is an “Automatically
controlled, reprogrammable, multipurpose manipulator programmable in three or more axes, which may be either
fixed in place or mobile for use in industrial automation applications”. Each element of the definition is essential
for a machine to be considered an industrial robot. Common applications of industrial robots include assembling,
dispensing, handling, processing, and welding (all of which are common in manufacturing).
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reported by the IFR because that measure assumes that robots do not depreciate for a period
of 12 years, yet lose all their economic value after exactly 12 years. We believe that gradual
depreciation is a more plausible description of reality, but use the IFR measure of the robots
stock in our robustness tests.
We complement the IFR data with information on labor hours, material inputs, IT capital, and
non-IT capital by industry-country-year from EU KLEMS. These data were originally reported
for 28 industries, which were mapped into the 16 sectors we use in the analysis. Table A1 in the
Appendix provides details on the exact correspondence we employed.
Following Graetz and Michaels (2018), we constructed an industry-level measure of replace-
ability using data from IFR on robot applications, the US census of occupational classifications
and the distribution of hours worked across occupations and industries from the 1980 US Census.
The IFR distinguishes between different applications of robots, including (among others) welding,
processing, and assembling (International Federation of Robotics, 2012). Using the 2000 Census
three-digit occupations, we assign a replaceability value of one to a three-digit occupation if the
name and/or description of at least one of the five-digit occupations included in it contains at least
one of the IFR application categories and zero otherwise. We assume that services occupations
are not replaceable by industrial robots and remove occupations that our text analysis algorithm
identifies as being potentially replaceable by robots but we believe are not, such as “agricultural
inspectors” and “artillery and missile officers”. We then map our replaceability measure into the
1990 Census occupational classification, which is available for the 1980 and 2000 censuses. If
several 2000 occupations map into one 1990 occupation, then we assign the 1990 occupation a
replaceability value of one if and only if at least one of the corresponding 2000 occupations has a
value of one. To measure replaceability at the industry level, we first assign these variables to each
individual in the 1980 IPUMS Census based on their reported 1990 occupation. We then assign
to each individual one of our 28 EU KLEMS industries based on a crosswalk to the 1990 Census
industry classification. We compute the fraction of replaceable hours for each of the 16 industries
by dividing the sum product of replaceability and annual hours worked by the total sum of hours
worked (applying person weights both when computing the numerator and the denominator).
The replaceability values represent an upper bound to the share of hours that may be performed
by robots—occupations are classified as replaceable even if only a small proportion of their work
can be replaced by robots.
We combined this information with product-level bilateral data on trade and import tariffs.
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Trade data come from BACI, the World trade database developed by CEPII, building on original
data provided by the COMTRADE database of the United Nations Statistical Division. These
data contain annual information on bilateral exports and imports at the HS 6-digit product
disaggregation for 224 countries. In our final estimation sample we focus on trade between 26
OECD countries for which we have both EU KLEMS and IFR data (Northern countries), and 181
non-OECD (Southern countries). We exclude from our analysis OECD countries for which we do
not have either IFR or EU KLEMS data. Annual data on bilateral applied tariffs by country and
product (SITC 2-dig., Rev. 4) come from the TRAINS database of the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development. The tariff data are generally available for the period of analysis, but
the extent of time coverage differs considerably across countries. The product-level trade and
tariff data were also mapped into the 16 sectors we use in the analysis, as detailed in Table A1 in
the Appendix.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
To set the stage for the analysis that follows, we first document trends in robotization. Robot
utilization varies widely not only across sectors, but also across countries. Figure 2 plots the
evolution of robot adoption by country, and shows that robotization is most advanced in high-
wage countries such as Germany, Denmark and Belgium. It also shows that robotization remains
limited in lower wage countries such as Romania and Bulgaria, though these countries are adopting
progressively more robots. Figure 3 provides evidence that robot adoption across countries is
closely aligned with GDP per capita. This evidence is consistent with the prediction of our
theoretical model that incentives for robot adoption are greater among countries with higher
productivity and labor costs.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the stock of robots per million hours across sectors. Auto-
motives, rubber and plastics, and metal are the sectors in which robotization is most pronounced
and has been advancing most rapidly. By contrast, the adoption of industrial robots in education,
agriculture, construction, utilities and other non-manufacturing sectors remains limited. These
differences in the extent of robot adoption across sectors reflect in part the technological feasibility
adoption. Figure 5 plots average adoption of robots across sectors over our entire sample period
against the share of jobs in a sector that are replaceable. The association between adoption and
replaceability is clearly positive, with sectors where a larger share of tasks can potentially be
performed by robots indeed using more robots, as also shown by Graetz and Michaels (2018).
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In sum, robot adoption has increased significantly over time, although at different speeds
in different countries and sectors, which is convenient for identification. Figures A1 and A2 in
the Appendix display clearly the extent of variation in robot adoption across sectors, countries
and time. In addition, the strong correlations of robot usage with both replaceability and initial
GDP per capita suggest the triple interaction between the degree of sectoral replaceability, the
initial GDP per capita and the price of robots (proxied by the global robot stock) is a suitable
instrument for robotization. Indeed, Figures A3 and A4 in the Appendix show that the change
in robot density observed between the initial and final years of our sample period is positively
correlated with initial income per capita and the share of replaceable tasks in the sector.12
5 Partial equilibrium estimates: Robots and North-South trade
This section reports the OLS and IV estimates of the effects of robotization in advanced economies
on their exports and imports with less developed countries.
5.1 Baseline estimates
Table 1 reports our baseline estimates of how robotization in Northern countries impacted their
trade with non-OECD countries. All specifications control for importer-exporter-year fixed effects
as well as industry-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by Northern country. Our
main result is that robotization in the North catalyzes trade by inducing a significant increase in
imports from and an even bigger surge in exports to non-OECD countries. As a consequence, net
imports from these countries decline significantly. According to our OLS estimates a 10 percentage
points increase in the number of robots per million hours in developed countries is associated with
both a 1.5 percentage points increase in imports from non-OECD countries and a 4.1 percentage
points increase in exports to non-OECD countries, as shown in columns (1) and (2) respectively.
Net imports from the South would thus reduce by 2.6 percentage points, as is documented in
column (3).
The estimated association between robot intensity and trade flows strengthens substantially
when the extent of robotization is instrumented using the triple interaction between the share
of jobs in a sector that are replaceable (which serves as a proxy for the technological feasibility
of robotization), a country’s initial GDP per capita (which serves as a proxy for labor costs and
12Figures A3 reveals that Denmark is an outlier with regard to changes in robot density. The econometric results
reported below do not depend on its inclusion in the estimation sample.
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hence the economic incentives to robotize) and the global robot stock (which serves as a proxy for
the rental rate of robots). The estimates in columns (4)-(6) suggest that a 10 percentage points
increase in robot adoption is now associated with a 6.1 percentage points increase in imports from
and a 11.8 percentage points increase in exports to non-OECD countries. Net imports would fall
by 5.7 percentage points. The fact that IV estimates are higher than OLS estimates could reflect
a local average treatment effect or attenuation bias associated with measurement error in our
robotization variable, and lends credence to a causal interpretation of the association between
robotization and trade. Note also that our instrument performs well and strongly predicts robot
adoption: the Kleibergen-Paap statistic is 111.8.
5.2 Robustness
In this section we report the results of several robustness tests to our baseline analysis. A potential
concern about the baseline results is that the association between trade and robotization could
reflect complementary investments in other forms of technological progress and/or changes in the
intensity of material inputs or capital usage. To assess this possibility, in Table 2 we add to the
baseline specifications presented in Table 1 controls for ICT capital, non-ICT capital and material
inputs. We also control for bilateral import tariffs applied by developed countries. The inclusion
of these controls does not appreciably alter the estimated magnitude of the association between
robot adoption and trade flows.
Another potential concern is that the baseline estimates might be driven by a select few sectors.
To assess whether this is the case, in Table 3 we exclude the automotive, rubber and plastics,
and metal industries, the three sectors in which automation is most widespread. If anything,
excluding these sectors magnifies the estimated elasticity of trade flows with respect to robot use.
Moreover, results remain statistically significant.
Our baseline estimation period includes the great depression of 2008/2009. We therefore worry
that our results might be influenced by cyclical variations associated with the crisis. To address
this concern, Panel A in Table 4 restricts the sample to the pre-crisis (i.e. pre 2008) period,
whereas panel B presents estimates for the post-crisis (i.e. post 2009) period. The results suggest
that the estimated impact of robotization on trade was qualitatively similar in the pre- and post-
crisis periods. In both cases, the estimates of the relationship between robot adoption and trade
suggest that robotization catalyzes trade, but reduces net imports from developing countries.
As an additional robustness check, we use variations over longer time periods (i.e., over 5-year
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intervals) for identification, instead of the yearly variation we exploit in the baseline analysis. The
results are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix. Reassuringly, they are qualitatively similar
to those of the baseline analysis. In Table A4 in the Appendix, we assess the sensitivity of the
results to using an alternative proxy for automation. Specifically, we use the natural log of the
IFR stock of robots per million hours worked, instead of the robot stock we constructed using
the perpetual inventory method. The results obtained using this alternative measure are very
similar to those obtained using our preferred measure. In Table A5, we assess the impact of
extreme values by excluding the top 1% of observations of both the automation and each of the
dependent variables. The estimates remain very similar, suggesting that our baseline estimates are
not driven by outliers. In Table A6, we use the inverse hyperbolic sine of the regression variables
(instead of adding one and taking the log) to account for zeros. The results are robust to this
alternative transformation. The results are also remain when controlling for importer-industry
fixed effects in addition to importer-exporter and year fixed effects, as is shown in table A7. To
address the concern that robots usage may be mechanically correlated with imports and exports of
robots (because robots themselves are tradable goods), we re-estimate our baseline specifications
excluding industrial robots (HS code 847950) from the trade flows. We do this both for the entire
sample period as is shown in Table A8 and after 2002, when the HS code for industrial robots
was first introduced, as is shown in Table A9. The qualitative pattern of results does not change,
and is also robust to excluding trade in machinery (the industry in which robots are classified) as
is shown in Table A10.
Finally, in Table 5 we consider specifications using alternative instruments, notably average
robot usage per million hours in the same sector in countries at very similar levels of GDP per
capita. This alternative IV strategy follows closely that adopted by Acemoglu and Restrepo
(2017b) in their analysis of the local labor market impacts of robotization in the US. We report
results both when instrumenting robot intensity with robotization in the two most similar coun-
tries in terms of GDP per capita as well as the four most similar countries. Both instruments
perform reasonably well, in the sense that they have explanatory power in predicting robotization
(albeit that they are significantly weaker than our preferred instrument). The resulting coeffi-
cient estimates are marginally different from those obtained using our preferred IV, but the overall
pattern of results remains essentially unchanged.
Overall, these results provide robust evidence that robot adoption by Northern producers
stimulates their imports from less developed countries and has an even larger impact on their
19
exports to developing countries, such that their net imports from developing countries decline.
5.3 Heterogeneity and mechanisms
We proceed by examining the extent to which our baseline estimates vary with stage of devel-
opment among non-OECD countries. To this end, Table 6 splits the sample into high-income
non-OECD trading partners (Panel A) and the remainder countries, i.e. low and middle income
nations, which comprise the bulk of our sample (Panel B). The estimates reveal that robotization
significantly promotes both imports from and exports to both sets of countries. They further sug-
gest that the positive impact of robotization on imports is especially pronounced in high-income
non-OECD countries. According to our preferred IV estimates these effects are even stronger than
the impact on exports to high-income trading partners. The null hypothesis that automation did
not impact net imports from high-income non-OECD destinations is not rejected. By contrast,
net imports from low- and middle-income destinations are significantly negatively correlated with
robotization in the North.
In our theory, trade in intermediate goods is the key channel whereby robotization may stim-
ulate imports from the South. To assess the extent to which the data provide support to this
mechanism, we examine if the effects of robotization on imports are heterogeneous across inter-
mediate and other goods. Although it is empirically challenging to precisely identify imports of
intermediate goods (and distinguish them from imports of other goods), we use two product-level
classifications that have been widely adopted in the literature to achieve this objective. First,
the BACI data set makes it possible to distinguish between intermediate inputs from other goods
using the Broad Economic Categories Classification of the UN (see Appendix B.1 for details).
Second, we adopt the approach proposed by Schott (2004), who identifies as inputs only those
goods for which the product codes explicitly contain the words “parts” or “components”. For both
these classifications, the IV estimates in columns (2) and (4) in Table 7 reveal that robotization
has a considerably stronger positive impact on imports of intermediate than on other goods.
6 Counterfactual simulations
In this section, we use our theory to perform counterfactual simulations on the general equilibrium
effects of reductions in robot prices on trade patterns, wages and welfare in the North and the
South. To approximate the setting we explored in the regressions, we calibrate a model with
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three countries and three sectors. We consider a representative high-income Northern country,
a representative country in the South, and a group of other (lower-income) developed countries.
The existence of a group of other developed countries allows us to examine the extent to which the
quantified model is able to reproduce the relative trade effects we documented in the regressions.13
Among the three sectors considered, two sectors are tradable and the other sector is non-
tradable. Production may be subject to robotization only in one of the tradable sectors. This
sector consists of automotive, rubber and plastic, electronics, chemicals, metal and machinery
industries. The non-robotized tradable sector consists of all other manufacturing industries, in-
cluding food and textiles, agriculture, mining and utilities. The non-tradable sector consists of
construction and services.
6.1 Data and calibration
We use the World Input Output Database (WIOD) to calibrate international trade, production
functions and labor shares. In the baseline simulation, we use WIOD data for 2005 to calibrate
initial trade patterns. We group countries into three broad categories, based on their income per
capita, robot density and data availability. The group of countries in the North is composed of
Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden and the United States.
The group of countries in the South is composed of Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Turkey
and Taiwan, China. Based on these two groupings, we construct the representative countries
in the North and South. The group of other developed countries results from the aggregation
of other OECD and EU countries for which data are available in WIOD. This group consists
of Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Spain, the United Kingdom, Greece,
Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Poland, Norway and Switzerland.14
As detailed in Appendix B3, we have performed robustness checks using a variety of alternative
groupings, and found that the results are qualitatively robust.
In the model, workers are perfectly mobile across sectors. Wages are therefore similar across
13If we were to aggregate all groups, the North would account for more than 50% of world GDP, and the bulk of
world trade would occur within the North. This setting would underrepresent the importance of North-South trade,
and trade as share of GDP would be very small. To avoid this aggregation bias, we construct instead representative
countries in the North and the South. Considering a relatively large group of other developed countries is also
important to allow for the possibility that competitiveness gains associated with robot adoption in the North
translate into higher demand for its final-goods exports.
14We excluded small countries (with population up to 3 million) and the Russian Federation (which is neither
a member of the OECD nor the EU). We also excluded the Republic of Korea and Japan, which have high robot
stocks according the IFR, but were not included in the empirical analysis due to lack of data on labor hours by
industry.
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sectors within countries, but differ across countries due to productivity differences. We assume
that initial wages are proportional to the average GDP per capita of each group in thousands
of U.S. dollars. We set initial wages to 39.5 in the North, 26.7 in Other, and 5.7 in the South.
According to our calculations, the average ratio of replaceable tasks in the robotized tradeable
sector defined above is approximately 50%, thus we set Ki = 0.5 for this sector and set Ki = 0 for




wR = 59. This parameterization ensures that initial robotization in the North is equal
to that observed in the data, whereas robotization in Other and South is negligible.16 We then
examine the effects of exogenous reductions in the effective rental rate of robots, from the initial
level to 5. This decline in the effective rental rate of robots can be caused by a decline in nominal
robot prices and/or an increase in the productivity of robots. We assume that the first and
second stage have similar production processes. We calibrate the labor share using information
on the wage bill from WIOD. The fixed factor share is set to be equal to one minus the labor and
intermediate input share. We take the number of workers in each sector from WIOD and assume
that the share of workers in the first and second stages is proportional to the relative size of each
stage. Since the utility function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas, the elasticity of substitution
between composites of different sectors is equal to one. The Cobb-Douglas shares are calibrated
from WIOD. We set the elasticity parameter θ = 5, so that the trade elasticity is equal to −6.
We assume that the elasticity of substitution between robots and workers is high and equal to 10,
thus we set ν = 9.17 Appendix B3 provides details on the data and additional parameters we use
to calibrate the model, the solution method, and robustness checks.
6.2 Effects of Northern robotization on North-South trade
We first examine if the calibrated model is able to qualitatively reproduce the key empirical
findings we documented above. The upper-left panel of Figure 6 shows how increased robot
density in the North in the tradeable sector in which automation is feasible impacts exports to
the South. The diagram depicts the percentage change of exports from North to South (relative
15We also experimented with Ki = 0.8 for the robotized sector and the qualitative implications were unchanged.
16We assume that the price of one robot is equal to $125,000, that robots can work 365 days per year and 24
hours per day, and can be rented for 10% of their price for a year. Then the implied cost of robots relative to the
cost of tasks in robotized sector is equal to 1.3% both in the IFR data and in the calibrated model.
17Although there are no explicit estimates of the elasticity of substitution between robots and workers in the
literature, they are perceived to be highly substitutable. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017b) assume that the elasticity
is infinite. As detailed in Appendix B3, we performed sensitivity tests using different values for this elasticity, and
found that the results remain qualitatively unchanged.
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to the exports from other countries to the South) in the industry that is subject to robotization.
Consistent with the regressions discussed in section 5, the quantified model reveals that increased
robotization in the North (reflecting a fall in robot prices) leads to a relative expansion of exports
to the South. This effect is driven by robot-induced gains in Northern competitiveness in this
industry. Perhaps more surprisingly, the upper-right panel of Figure 6 shows that the South
also experiences a relative increase in sectoral exports to the North (relative to the exports of
other countries to the North). This expansion is driven by the growth of exports of intermediate
inputs, reflecting increased demand for these goods by final good producers in the North. The
model is therefore able to replicate the main empirical finding reported in the previous section.
Importantly, the lower panel of Figure 6 reveals that these relative trade impacts reflect a surge
in North-South trade flows not only in relative, but also in absolute terms. Total trade flows
increase: the lower-left panel of Figure 6 shows that Northern robotization leads to an increase
in the value of exports from North to South; the lower-right panel shows that it also leads to
an increase in the value of exports from South to North, which is driven by the expansion of
intermediate goods trade.
6.3 Effects of robot price reductions on trade, wages and welfare
Like in the IV regressions presented above, in our model the relative increase in robot density
observed in Figure 6 results from the interaction between an exogenous decline in robot prices,
differences in labor costs across countries (reflecting productivity differences) and the sector-
specific robotization frontier. The upper-left panel of Figure 7 shows how a reduction in robot
prices impacts robot adoption (as proxied by robots per worker) in the sector in which automation
is feasible. The upper-right panel shows how falling robot prices influence the response of the
ratio between the unit cost of tasks and the wage rate. We observe that a fall in robot prices
(common to all countries) initially leads to increased adoption in the North, where the cost of
labor (and thus the cost saving associated with robotization) is relatively higher to begin with.
As robot prices decline further, the other (lower-income) developed countries also begin to adopt.
Interestingly, the quantified model suggests that robotization will only become profitable in the
South in the face of a very substantial decline in robot prices.
The lower-left panel in Figure 7 indicates that increased robot adoption in the North ini-
tially depresses labor demand, and thereby leads to a fall in the real wage of Northern workers
(lower-right panel). As the price of robots declines, a larger share of tasks previously performed
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by humans is now performed by robots. Workers are therefore displaced from the sector that is
subject to automation and must seek employment in other sectors of the economy. While overall
production expands as a result of increased robot adoption, aggregate labor demand falls dur-
ing this process, depressing real wages in the North. Interestingly, however, Figure 7 points to
an important non-linearity in the relationship between wages and robot prices: as robot prices
decline further, Northern wages start recovering and eventually rise above the level that was ob-
served initially. While robot adoption deepens in the North, production in the robotized sector
continues to expand, thereby raising demand for the tasks in which robotization is technologically
unfeasible. As we move closer to the robotization frontier in the sector, this effect fully offsets
the direct negative impact of robots on sectoral labor demand. Eventually, the share of labor
in the robotized sector starts to expand, thereby raising aggregate labor demand and wages in
the North. Aggregate welfare in the North always increases, as the income losses associated with
lower labor income are more than offset by the gains associated with increased production, lower
consumer prices and increased income from the rental rate of robots (Figure 8).
Even if production in the South is not subject to robotization, real wages and welfare are
impacted by Northern automation. Increased robotization and reduced wages make Northern
producers more competitive. This leads to an increase in Northern exports in the robotized
industry, and to a corresponding reduction in final goods exports from the South in this sector.
At the same time, the South expands its exports of intermediates in this sector. Both total real
exports and exports measured as a share of GDP increase in the South (see top panels of Figure
8). As shown in Figures 7 and 8, real wages and welfare tend to increase in the South, reflecting
also lower consumer prices. These effects are reinforced when robot prices decline further and the
other countries in the North also find it optimal to robotize their own production. Welfare gains
in the South are likely to be even more pronounced if robotization also becomes feasible there.
6.4 The role of trade frictions
As emphasized above, trade in intermediate and final goods is the key channel whereby Northern
robotization impacts real wages and welfare in the South. A natural question is, then, how trade
costs modulate the impact of robot price reductions on Southern workers and consumers. To
answer this question, we perform counterfactual simulations on the effects of robot price reductions
under two different trade cost scenarios. First, we consider a frictionless trade scenario, in which
trade frictions are assumed to fall down to zero (from the level that was initially observed in the
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2005 data). We then compute the new equilibrium associated with frictionless trade, and examine
the effects of reductions in robot prices from this point. Similarly, we consider a high trade costs
scenario, in which the level of trade frictions are assumed to be twice of the level that was initially
calibrated.
Figure 9 displays the effects of Northern robotization on North-South trade under the friction-
less trade regime. The figure reveals that the effects of Northern robotization on exports to the
South in this sector remain qualitatively similar, but the rate of change is now considerably higher.
Robotization still makes final-goods producers in the North more competitive, and the associated
impact on their exports is now considerably higher. At the same time, the automation-induced
expansion of production continues to have a positive effect on exports of intermediates from the
South to the North. The magnitude of this effect is now considerably stronger, generating a
sizable impact on total exports from the South to the North in the robotized sector.
Figure 10 depicts the impacts of robot price reductions on robot use, labor allocation, wages
and real GDP under frictionless trade. Interestingly, we observe that robot price reductions lead
to relatively lower robot use by other countries than in the baseline simulations. Under frictionless
trade, production in other countries is less shielded from Northern competition in the robotized
sector. Therefore, there is more scope for robot-induced changes in international specialization,
implying that robot adoption in this sector proceeds at a relatively slower pace. At the same
time, the positive effects of Northern robotization on real wages and welfare in the South are now
more significant. Since trade is the key channel by which Northern robotization benefits Southern
workers and consumers, a reduction in trade frictions amplifies the importance of this channel.
By the same token, Figures A5 and A6 in the Appendix reveal that the importance of this channel
would be reduced if trade frictions were higher than in the baseline simulation.
7 Concluding remarks
Recent empirical evidence reveals that the adoption of modern industrial robots has already had
important implications for productivity and labor markets in high-income countries. This paper
has shown that even though less developed nations have not yet adopted these technologies on a
large scale, they have not remained insulated from their impacts. Northern robotization impacts
international trade in intermediate and final goods, and thereby also impacts wages and welfare
in other countries.
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We have developed a task-based Ricardian theory featuring two-stage production and trade
in intermediate and final goods to examine the implications of industrial robotization for North-
South trade, wages and welfare. In the model, a subset of tasks required in the production of
intermediate and final goods can be performed either by workers or robots, while other tasks
can only be executed by humans. Robots compete with human labor in factor markets, while
countries compete in sector-specific product markets for inputs and outputs. Relative production
costs determine country-specific robotization and trade patterns. A fall in the global price of
industrial robots initially induces adoption in the North, where the cost of labor (and consequently
cost savings associated with automation) is (are) relatively higher to begin with. Robots replace
domestic labor, leading to lower production costs and higher exports. Imports from the South
may rise or fall, depending on the extent to which Northern production requires intermediate
inputs from the South. The stronger the dependence of Northern producers on inputs from the
South, the more likely it is that Northern automation will catalyze, rather than curb, imports
from the South.
Simple OLS regressions using panel data by country and sector on trade and robots point
to a positive relationship between robot intensity in own production and imports sourced from
less developed countries. They also reveal an even stronger association with exports to these
countries. The direction of causality is further supported by an instrumental variable strategy
motivated by our theory, exploiting variation in exposure to robotization across countries and
sectors. The positive impact of Northern robotization on imports from the South is mainly driven
by exchanges of parts and components, which attests to the importance of explicitly modeling
input-output linkages. Models that only consider final goods trade would fail to anticipate the
sizable surge in imports of intermediates from the South that Northern robotization induces.
We then turned back to our theoretical model to study quantitatively the effects of robot price
reductions on wages and welfare, both in the North and in the South. Increased robot adoption
in the North initially depresses labor demand, and therefore leads to lower wages. Nevertheless,
robotization induces welfare gains, as the income losses associated with lower labor income are
more than offset by the gains associated with increased production, lower prices, and increased
income from the rental rate of robots. Interestingly, the model points to an important non-
linearity in the relationship between wages and robot prices. As robot adoption proceeds in the
North, production in the robotized sector continues to expand, thereby raising demand for the
tasks in which robotization is technologically unfeasible. Eventually, the share of labor in the
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robotized sector starts to expand, thereby raising overall labor demand and leading to higher
wages in the North.
Even if production in the South is not subject to robotization, Southern wages and welfare
are impacted by robot-induced shifts in international specialization. While robotization makes
Northern producers more competitive, it also raises demand for Southern inputs. Real wages
and welfare are likely to increase in the South, reflecting also lower consumer prices. Welfare
gains in the South are likely to be even more pronounced if robotization also becomes feasible
there. Given that trade in intermediate and final goods is the key channel whereby Northern
robotization impacts wages and welfare in the South, the importance of this channel is magnified
if trade frictions are removed.
Although our model relies on static mechanisms, the main channels we emphasize may have
important implications for the link between openness and economic development. Buera and
Oberfield (2017) emphasize that international trade is an important channel behind the transmis-
sion and diffusion of best practices across countries, and has therefore been an important driver of
the post-war growth miracles experienced by China, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, China. If
Northern robotization leads to an increase in trade flows with the South, the relative importance
of this channel may be amplified. Exploring these issues in the context of a dynamic model of
trade and growth is an important task for future human research.
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Notes: The upper panel depicts the relationship between the relative factor prices and the optimal set of tasks
performed by robots. The horizontal axis shows the robotization frontier, Ki, the set of tasks initially performed
by robots, Km,iR , and the number of tasks performed by robots after a 25% reduction in robot rental rates, K
m,i∗
R .





RζR(k)wR. The lower panel shows the values of the price of a task relative to wages, Ω
m,i, and the
number of workers demanded in equilibrium to produce a unit of task, Ξm,i, (vertical axis) for a given reduction
in wR (horizontal axis). The robotization frontier, K
i, is assumed to be 0.5 and other parameter values are taken
from the calibration exercise in Section 6.
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Notes: Figure depicts the stock of industrial robots by country (averaged across sectors).
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Notes: Figure depicts the relationship between average robot density by country (averaged across years) and the
initial GDP per capita.
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Notes: Figure depicts the stock of industrial robots by sector (averaged across countries).
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Notes: Figure depicts the relationship between average robot density by sector (averaged across countries and
years) and the share of replaceable jobs in the industry.
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Figure 6: Effects of Northern robotization on North-South trade
































































































































Notes: Figure depicts the results of counterfactual simulations on the effects increased robot density in the North on North-South trade flows in the industry in
which production is robotized. The upper panel presents relative effects on exports of the representative country in the North or South (relative to other developed
countries). The lower panel presents absolute impacts on real export values of the representative country in the North or South. The thick line refers to total
exports, while the dashed line refers to exports of intermediate goods.
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Figure 7: Effects of robot price reductions on robot use, cost reduction, labor allocation and wages
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Notes: Figure depicts the results of counterfactual simulations on the effects of reductions in robot prices on robot use per worker in the robotized sector (upper-left
panel), robot-induced cost reduction (upper-right panel), number of workers in the robotized sector (lower-left panel) and real wages (lower-right panel). The
long-dashed line refers to the representative higher-income country in the North, the thick line refers to the South, while the short-dashed line refers to other
lower-income Northern countries.
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Figure 8: Effects of reductions in robot prices on exports, real GDP and consumer prices
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Notes: Figure depicts the simulated effects of reductions in robot prices on total exports (upper-left panel), ratio of exports and GDP (upper-right panel), real
GDP (lower-left panel) and consumer prices (lower-right panel). Robotization occurs only in the sector in which the North has a comparative advantage. The
long-dashed line refers to the North, the thick line refers to the South, while the short-dashed line refers to other developed countries.
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Figure 9: Effects of Northern robotization on North-South trade (frictionless trade)
































































































































Notes: Figure depicts the results of counterfactual simulations on the effects increased robot density in the North on North-South trade flows in the industry in
which production is robotized, assuming frictionless trade. The upper panel presents relative effects on exports of the representative country in the North or South
(relative to other developed countries). The lower panel presents absolute impacts on real export values of the representative country in the North or South. The
thick line refers to total exports, while the dashed line refers to exports of intermediate goods.
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Figure 10: Effects of robot price reductions on robot use, labor allocation, wages and real GDP (frictionless trade)
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Notes: Figure depicts the results of counterfactual simulations on the effects of reductions in robot prices on robot use per worker in the robotized sector (upper-left
panel), number of workers in the robotized sector (lower-left panel), real wages (upper-right panel) and real GDP (lower-right panel), assuming frictionless trade.
The long-dashed line refers to the representative higher-income country in the North, the thick line refers to the South, while the short-dashed line refers to other
lower-income Northern countries.
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Table 1: The impact of robotization on North-South trade
OLS IV
Dependent variable: log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(1+imp1+exp ) log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(
1+imp
1+exp )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(1 + robotshours ) 0.1534** 0.4117*** -0.2583*** 0.6144*** 1.1839*** -0.5695***
(0.0690) (0.1238) (0.0684) (0.2156) (0.3146) (0.1529)
First stage:
Replaceability * initial GDPpc * global robot stock 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813
R2 0.6351 0.7738 0.3912 0.6314 0.7655 0.3887
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 111.795 111.795 111.795
Importer-exporter-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table reports OLS and IV results of equation (23) in text, using the baseline estimation sample. Columns (1)-(3) report the OLS results, while columns (4)-(6)
report the IV and corresponding first stage estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by developed country are presented in parentheses. ***1% level, **5% level, *10%
level.
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Table 2: Additional controls
OLS IV
Dependent variable: log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(1+imp1+exp ) log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(
1+imp
1+exp )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(1 + robotshours ) 0.1694** 0.4309*** -0.2615*** 0.6370*** 1.2130*** -0.5760***
(0.0635) (0.1216) (0.0712) (0.2145) (0.3175) (0.1561)
log (1 + material inputs) 0.0029 0.0939 -0.0910 -0.1710 -0.1970 0.0259
(0.1013) (0.1662) (0.1140) (0.1227) (0.2142) (0.1225)
log (1 + IT capital) 4.8065 7.8370 -3.0306 12.0230*** 19.9068** -7.8838
(3.9050) (7.3223) (6.2491) (3.4734) (8.7868) (7.4821)
log (1 + non-IT capital) -19.3898** -31.3726* 11.9828 -31.2832*** -51.2645*** 19.9813*
(7.2922) (16.5164) (11.0901) (7.2316) (15.6678) (11.3884)
log (1 + tariffs) 0.5462*** 0.2371 0.3091*** 0.5589*** 0.2584* 0.3005***
(0.0725) (0.1650) (0.0989) (0.0643) (0.1500) (0.0925)
First stage:
Replaceability * initial GDPpc * global robot stock 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813
R2 0.6354 0.7742 0.3913 0.6318 0.7659 0.3889
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald-F-stat 105.254 105.254 105.254
Importer-exporter-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table reports OLS and IV results of equation (23) in text, using the baseline estimation sample. Columns (1)-(3) report the OLS results, while columns (4)-(6)
report the IV and corresponding first stage estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by developed country are presented in parentheses. ***1% level, **5% level, *10%
level.
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Table 3: Excluding top-3 most robotized sectors: automotives, rubber and plastics, metal
OLS IV
Dependent variable: log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(1+imp1+exp ) log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(
1+imp
1+exp )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(1 + robotshours ) 0.2009* 0.4443*** -0.2434*** 0.8618** 1.6272*** -0.7654***
(0.0987) (0.1571) (0.0811) (0.3259) (0.4248) (0.1765)
First stage:
Replaceability * initial GDPpc * global robot stock 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0023***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Observations 722,592 722,592 722,592 722,592 722,592 722,592
R2 0.6163 0.7595 0.3723 0.6106 0.7446 0.3670
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald-F-stat 115.011 115.011 115.011
Importer-exporter-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table reports OLS and IV results of equation (23) in text, excluding the top-3 most robotized sectors from the baseline estimation sample (automotives, rubber
and plastics, metal). Columns (1)-(3) report the OLS results, while columns (4)-(6) report the IV and corresponding first stage estimates. Robust standard errors
clustered by developed country are presented in parentheses. ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table 4: Excluding the 2008/2009 financial crisis
OLS IV
Dependent variable: log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(1+imp1+exp ) log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(
1+imp
1+exp )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Pre 2008
log(1 + robotshours ) 0.1016 0.3297** -0.2280** 0.6520*** 1.2577*** -0.6057***
(0.0728) (0.1441) (0.0848) (0.2317) (0.3405) (0.1946)
First stage:
Replaceability * initial GDPpc * global robot stock 0.0035*** 0.0035*** 0.0035***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Observations 417,799 417,799 417,799 417,799 417,799 417,799
R2 0.6343 0.7777 0.3985 0.6297 0.7670 0.3953
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald-F-stat 32.893 32.893 32.893
B. Post 2009
log(1 + robotshours ) 0.1767** 0.4181*** -0.2414*** 0.6058** 1.0963*** -0.4904***
(0.0747) (0.1155) (0.0658) (0.2318) (0.3318) (0.1514)
First stage:
Replaceability * initial GDPpc * global robot stock 0.0026*** 0.0026*** 0.0026***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations 351,008 351,008 351,008 351,008 351,008 351,008
R2 0.6363 0.7725 0.3870 0.6327 0.7653 0.3852
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald-F-stat 101.515 101.515 101.515
Importer-exporter-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table reports OLS and IV results of equation (23) in text, excluding 2008/2009 from the baseline estimation sample. Columns (1)-(3) report the OLS results,
while columns (4)-(6) report the IV and corresponding first stage estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by developed country are presented in parentheses. ***1%
level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table 5: Alternative instruments
IV IV
Dependent variable: log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(1+imp1+exp ) log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(
1+imp
1+exp )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(1 + robotshours ) 0.5825** 1.4069*** -0.8244*** 0.5762** 1.2756** -0.6995**
(0.2333) (0.3403) (0.2576) (0.2745) (0.4565) (0.2756)
First stage:
log(1 + robotshours ) in two countries 0.2743** 0.2743** 0.2743**
with most similar GDP per capita (0.1000) (0.1000) (0.1000)
log(1 + robotshours ) in four countries 0.3247** 0.3247** 0.3247**
with most similar GDP per capita (0.1182) (0.1182) (0.1182)
Observations 786,797 786,797 786,797 854,589 854,589 854,589
R2 0.6282 0.7608 0.3855 0.6255 0.7580 0.3874
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald-F-stat 7.523 7.523 7.523 7.546 7.546 7.546
Importer-exporter-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table reports OLS and IV results of equation (23) in text, using the baseline estimation sample and alternative instruments. Columns (1)-(3)
report the OLS results, while columns (4)-(6) report the IV and corresponding first stage estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by developed
country are presented in parentheses. ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table 6: Heterogeneity by income level of non-OECD countries
OLS IV
Dependent variable: log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(1+imp1+exp ) log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(
1+imp
1+exp )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. High-income non-OECD countries
log(1 + robotshours ) 0.3187*** 0.4851*** -0.1664** 1.0488*** 1.1087*** -0.0599
(0.0800) (0.1202) (0.0626) (0.2927) (0.2944) (0.1987)
First stage :
Replaceability * initial GDPpc * global robot stock 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations 80,080 80,080 80,080 80,080 80,080 80,080
R2 0.6674 0.8266 0.3889 0.6593 0.8217 0.3886
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald-F-stat 110.960 110.960 110.960
B. Low and middle-income non-OECD countries
log(1 + robotshours ) 0.1370* 0.4044*** -0.2674*** 0.5716** 1.1913*** -0.6197***
(0.0688) (0.1247) (0.0702) (0.2094) (0.3193) (0.1593)
First stage :
Replaceability * initial GDPpc * global robot stock 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations 808,733 808,733 808,733 808,733 808,733 808,733
R2 0.6366 0.7677 0.3939 0.6333 0.7587 0.3908
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald-F-stat 111.830 111.830 111.830
Importer-exporter-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table reports OLS and IV results of equation (23) in text, using the sub-samples for non-OECD countries depending on their level of income per capita. Columns
(1)-(3) report the OLS results, while columns (4)-(6) report the IV and corresponding first stage estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by developed country are
presented in parentheses. ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table 7: Imports of intermediates versus other goods
BEC classification Schott (2004) classification
OLS IV OLS IV
Dependent variable: log(1 + imp) log(1 + imp) log(1 + imp) log(imp)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Intermediate goods
log(1 + robotshours ) 0.1094 0.6815** 0.2132*** 0.8566**
(0.0788) (0.3240) (0.0573) (0.3124)
First stage :
Replaceability * initial GDPpc * global robot stock 0.0027*** 0.0027***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813
R2 0.5137 0.5027 0.5278 0.5101
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald-F-stat 111.795 111.795
B. Other goods
log(1 + robotshours ) 0.1507*** 0.5627*** 0.1136* 0.4929**
(0.0511) (0.1680) (0.0619) (0.1906)
First stage :
Replaceability * initial GDPpc * global robot stock 0.0027*** 0.0027***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813
R2 0.6259 0.6226 0.6246 0.6220
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald-F-stat 111.795 111.800
Importer-exporter-year effects Y Y Y Y
Industry-year effects Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table reports OLS and IV results of equation (23) in text, using the sub-samples for imports of intermediate and other goods. Columns
(1)-(3) report the OLS results, while columns (2)-(4) report the IV and corresponding first stage estimates. Robust standard errors clustered
by developed country are presented in parentheses. ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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A.1 Price and cost multipliers













































A.2 Allocation of tasks and robotization
A.2.1 Optimal allocation of tasks
The optimal number of robots relative to workers does not depend on the production stage, since
the production technology and the cost structure of tasks are identical across stages within an
industry and country. Therefore, the solution does not depend on the stage of production and we
can omit subscript s.
Efficiency implies that robotized tasks (Tm,iA ) and non-robotized tasks (T
m,i
N ) are performed


















































The labor endowment is optimally split by producers into the two segments of the tasks space.
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A.2.2 Optimal allocation of labor
Producers have to allocate workers to tasks optimally, under the production of tasks outlined






















The ratio of tasks produced by workers between K and 1 is given by
Km,iN,L = 1−K
i. (A7)
The number of workers performing tasks below and above K to produce Tm,i units of tasks











where the total labor demand is Lm,i = Lm,iA + L
m,i
N .
A.2.3 Production cost with robotization





















































A.2.4 Production function with robotization




































































































The production function of varieties can be re-written with the introduction of robotization
q (ω) = z(ω)
(
ψi5












A.2.5 Labor and robot demand





































A.2.6 Preferences with CES utility function










where Q̃m,i2 is the amount of final goods from sector i demanded by consumers in country m, γ̃
m,i
is a constant, and the elasticity of substitution is defined as 11−ρ .




























B.1 Data sources and description
This appendix provides further details about the data used in the empirical analysis. The set
of developed countries included in our estimation sample is: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia,
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United King-
dom and United States. For each of these countries, the estimation sample includes all years for
which the IFR data are available during the period 1995-2015. We examine bilateral trade flows
between these countries and all non-OECD countries included in BACI. Table A1 reports the final
list of sectors used and their correspondence with the sectors defined in the original data sets.
Industrial robots: The stock of industrial robots by industry, country and year comes from
the International Federation of Robotics (IFR). These data are based on yearly surveys of robot
suppliers, and currently cover 75 countries (about 90 percent of the industrial robots market). The
IFR measures deliveries of “multipurpose manipulating industrial robots” based on the definitions
of the International Organization for Standardization. The data are disaggregated roughly at the
three-digit level for manufacturing and roughly at the two-digit level for non-manufacturing. We
focus only on tradable sectors, which are listed in Table A1.
To calculate a measure of the robot stock per sector, we use the perpetual inventory method
assuming a depreciation rate of 10%, following Graetz and Michaels (2018).18 We initialize the
series using the IFR measure of the stock of robots per sector in 1993. For countries for which
the 1993 sectoral breakdown of the stock of robots is not available, we initialize the series using
the initial robots stock for the first year for which it is available.19
The IFR data are regarded as the best source of information on industrial robots (Graetz
and Michaels, 2018; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2017b). Nonetheless, these data have some limita-
tions. First, about 30 percent of industrial robots are not classified into any industry. Following
Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017b), we allocate these unclassified robots to industries in the same
proportion as in the classified data. Second, the IFR data do not cover “dedicated industrial
robots”, which are defined as automatically controlled machines for only one industrial applica-
tion. Third, the time coverage of the IFR data varies substantially across countries. Moreover, a
detailed sectoral breakdown of the robot stock and deliveries is not always available for all years
even when countries are included in the IFR, so that our panel is unbalanced.20
18While the IFR data contain measures of the robot stock, we prefer to use estimates based on the perpetual
inventory method because the IFR measures are based on the assumption that the service lifetime of a robot is
exactly 12 years, exhibiting no depreciation whatsoever for the first 12 years and losing all their functionality after
the 12th year.
19For countries for which we have data on the aggregate (i.e. country-wide) stock of robots in years prior to
having the sectoral breakdown, we deflate the initial stock per sector as follows. We first construct a deflator by
dividing the sum of the IFR robot stock reported for each sector by the aggregate robot stock calculated using the
perpetual inventory method. We then use this deflator to obtain the sector-specific series.
20Up until 2010 robots used in Mexico and Canada are reported as being used in the United States. To account
for the attendant over-reporting of robots usage in the US, we first calculate what share of robots in the NAFTA
area were being used in the United States in 2011 and subsequently correct the US series assuming that during the
period prior to 2011 robots usage in the US, Canada and Mexico grew at equal pace.
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Labor hours and other inputs: Data on labor hours, material inputs, IT capital, non-IT
capital by industry-country-year come from EU KLEMS (Timmer, van Moergastel, Stuivenwold,
Ypma, O’Mahony, and Kangasniemi, 2007). These data were originally reported for 28 industries,
which were mapped into the sectoral classification of the IFR data (see Table A1).
Replaceability: Following Graetz and Michaels (2018), we constructed an industry-level
measure of replaceability using data from IFR on robot applications, the US census of occupa-
tional classifications and the distribution of hours across occupations and industries from the 1980
US Census. The IFR distinguishes between different applications of robots, including (among oth-
ers) welding, processing, and assembling (International Federation of Robotics, 2012). We take
the 2000 Census three-digit occupations and assign a replaceability value of one to the three-digit
occupation if the name and/or description of at least one of the SOC five-digit occupations in-
cluded in it contains at least one of these IFR application categories and zero otherwise. Note that
we assume that services occupations (occupations with SOC codes < 45000) are not replaceable.
In addition, this procedure inadvertently identifies some occupations as potentially replaceable
by robots that presumably are not, such as “agricultural inspectors”, “infantry”, and “airport
cargo handling supervisors”. These are typically occupations that include tasks and/or titles
such as “repair”, “inspect”, “drive”, “maintain”, “actor” etc. We remove such cases from the list
of potentially replaceable occupations.
We then map the resulting replaceability measure into the 1990 Census occupational classifi-
cation, which is available for the 1980 and 2000 censuses. If several 2000 occupations map into
one 1990 occupation, then we assign the 1990 occupation a replaceability value of one if and only
if at least one of the corresponding 2000 occupations has a value of one. To arrive at a measure
of replaceability at the industry level, we first assign individuals in the 1980 IPUMS Census a
replaceability score based on the 1990 occupation they report (assuming the value 1 if the oc-
cupation is replaceable, and 0 if it is not). We then assign each individual to one of our 28 EU
KLEMS industries based on a crosswalk to the 1990 Census industry classification. We compute
the fraction of replaceable hours for each of the 16 robot-using industries by dividing the sum
product of replaceability and annual hours worked by the total sum of hours worked (applying
person weights both when computing the numerator and the denominator). The replaceability
values represent an upper bound to the share of hours that is replaceable, because occupations
are classified as replaceable if only a part of their work can be replaced by robots; this part need
not be large.
Bilateral trade data: Product-level bilateral trade data come from BACI. This data set
is the World trade database developed by the CEPII, building on original data provided by
the COMTRADE database of the United Nations Statistical Division. BACI is constructed
using an original procedure that reconciles the declarations of the exporter and importer. This
harmonization procedure makes it possible to extend considerably the number of countries for
which trade data are available. BACI provides bilateral values and quantities of exports at the
HS 6-digit product disaggregation, for 224 countries and is available from 1995 onwards. CEPII
developed original statistical procedures to reconcile data reported by almost 150 countries to the
United Nations Statistics Division. First, as import values are reported CIF (cost, insurance and
freight) while exports are reported FOB (free on board), CIF costs are estimated and removed
from imports values to compute FOB import values. Second, the reliability of country reporting
is assessed based on the reporting distances among partners. These reporting qualities are used
as weights in the reconciliation of each bilateral trade flow twice reported. Due to the use of this
double information on each flow, BACI ends up covering a large set of countries not reporting
at a given level of the product classification. The data set gives information about the value (in
thousands of US dollars) and the quantity (in tons) of trade. Gaulier and Zignano (2010) provide
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a detailed description of the BACI data set.
Import tariffs: We use annual data on bilateral applied import tariffs by country and product
(SITC 2-dig., Rev. 4) from the TRAINS database of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development. While these data span our sample period, the extent of time coverage differs
considerably across countries.
Initial GDP per capita: We use data on GDP per capita of each developed country (in
constant 2000 USD) from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. We use values
for the first year the country is observed in the estimation sample.
B.2 Variable definitions and summary statistics
This section describes in detail the variables used in the econometric analysis. Table A2 provides
summary statistics on each of these variables.
log (1+exp): logarithm of one plus the FOB value of bilateral exports in thousands of US dollars
of developed country n to developing country m in sector i in year t.
log (1 + imp): logarithm of one plus the FOB value of bilateral imports in thousands of US
dollars from developed country n to developing country m in sector i in year t.
log(1 + robotshours ): logarithm of one plus the ratio between the stock of robots and the number of
working hours (in millions) in developed country n in sector i in year t. The stock of robots
was estimated suing the perpetual inventory method based on the observed stock of robots
in the IFR data and using a depreciation rate of 10%.
log(1 + obs.robotshours ): logarithm of one plus the ratio between the stock of robots and the number
of work hours (in millions) in developed country n in sector i in year t. The stock of robots
was directly observed in the IFR data set.
Initial GDPpc: GDP per capita (in constant 2000 USD) of developed country n in the first
year the country is observed in the estimation sample.
Replaceability: proportion of US jobs in 1980 that were in occupations that are replaceable by
robots.
Global robot stock: global stock of robots. The stock of robots was estimated using the perpet-
ual inventory method based on the observed stock of robots in the IFR data and using a
depreciation rate of 10%.
log (1 + material inputs): logarithm of one plus the expenditure on material inputs in developed
country n in sector i in year t.
log (1 + IT capital): logarithm of one plus the expenditure on IT capital in developed country
n in sector i in year t.
log (1 + non-IT capital): logarithm of one plus the expenditure on non-IT capital in developed
country n in sector i in year t.
log (1 + tariff): logarithm of one plus the ad valorem import tariff applied by developed country
n to developing country m in sector i in year t.
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B.3 Counterfactual simulations
B.3.1 Computation of production and consumption shares
The production and consumption shares are calibrated using WIOD. The production share pa-
rameter of inputs, αm,iM , is calculated by dividing the stage one expenditure by the total output
of a given industry. The labor share parameter, αm,iT , is calibrated using the wage bill (adjusted
using equation (A14) with the equilibrium share of robots, initial wages and initial robot rental
rate). The consumption share parameter, γm,i, is calibrated using the expenditure on stage two
outputs. All calibrated parameters, initial wages and robot prices are reported in Table A11.
B.3.2 Computation of the trade matrix
We index South as m = 1, Other as m = 2 and North as m = 3. We index individual countries
with m̃ and ñ, and country sets with m and n. Define N1 = 7, N2 = 1 and N3 = 9, M1 =Brazil,
China, ..., M2 =Australia, Austria, ..., and M3 =Belgium, Germany, .... Let Y
m̃,ñ,i
s denote the
trade flow between m̃ and ñ for industry i and stage s. The structure of WIOD is similar to OECD
input-output tables, with multiple countries in each column and row. A row reveals how output
of a given industry for a specific country is used across different columns. Take an entry from the
database. If both its row and column correspond to an industry within the sector, we consider
that entry as a part of the first stage output of the sector. The other entries, including those that
correspond to consumption by households or government, are considered a part of second stage
output. For a given entry, a country in the row is the origin country, while the country in the
column is the destination country. We construct Y m̃,ñ,is for each individual country. We define
















s , m = n
(A18)
Additionally, we assume that all NT sector output is final.
B.3.3 Solution method
We follow the solution methods of Caliendo and Parro (2015) and Caliendo, Dvorkin, and Parro
(forthcoming), and calculate the new equilibrium after an exogenous reduction of robot prices
using changes in variables from their initial values. For the purpose of the solution, we can treat
first and second stage production as different industries, and impose that first stage output is only
demanded by producers as intermediate inputs, while second stage output is only used for final
household consumption. Our model then becomes a special case of Caliendo and Parro (2015)
with additional task structure involving robots and additional fixed factors. The task structure
does not affect the solution method significantly. The only difference (with regard to the solution
method) is the inclusion of cost reduction variable Ωm,i, and the related labor demand variable,
Ξm,i. Given the exogenous effective robot rental rate,
φiR
φiL
wR, it is straightforward to solve for Ω
m,i
using (11). We then plug the change in the cost reduction parameter into the equation used in the
solution. Similarly, we can solve for the labor demand variable Ξm,i using (12). The changes in
labor allocations can be easily solved jointly with the changes in equilibrium wages, productivity
and cost reduction using (21b). Apart from the variables Ξm,i and Ωm,i, the solution is similar to
other papers in the literature, and therefore we omit further details.
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B.3.4 Robustness checks
Alternative country groupings: We performed several checks to assess the extent to which
our results are sensitive to different country groupings. We first used individual countries from the
North (rather than the average). We confirmed that the results are robust for almost all countries.
The results only change qualitatively when North consists of only the United States. Since the
United States accounts for a large share of world GDP, and trade accounts for a small share of
output, their imports from the South do not increase with domestic robotization, similar to the
counterfacual exercise with high trade costs presented in the Appendix. For all other outcomes, the
results are qualitatively similar to the baseline simulations. In addition, we performed simulations
with different country groupings.
Alternative parameters: We also performed several checks to assess if our results are sensitive
to the choice for some key parameters. In the baseline calibration, we assume that the elasticity
of substitution between robots and workers is equal to 10, thus we set ν = 9. In alternative simu-
lations, we assumed elasticities of substitution between 5 and 30, and the qualitative implications
were unchanged. The results also remained qualitatively similar under different robotization fron-
tiers (such as Ki = 0.8) and different elasticities of substitution across products from different
industries (with values between 1 and 5).
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Notes: Figure depicts the stock of industrial robots by country-sector.
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Notes: Figure depicts the stock of industrial robots by sector-country.
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Notes: Figure depicts the relationship between the change in the robot density by country between the first and
final years of the sample and the initial GDP per capita.
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Notes: Figure depicts the relationship between the change in average robot density by sector between 1995 and
2015 and the industry’s replaceability index.
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Figure A5: Effects of Northern robotization on North-South trade (high trade costs)
























































































































Notes: Figure depicts the results of counterfactual simulations on the effects increased robot density in the North on North-South trade flows in the industry in
which production is robotized, assuming that trade costs are twice as high as in the baseline simulation. The upper panel presents relative effects on exports of
the representative country in the North or South (relative to other developed countries). The lower panel presents absolute impacts on real export values of the
representative country in the North or South. The thick line refers to total exports, while the dashed line refers to exports of intermediate goods.
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Figure A6: Effects of robot price reductions on robot use, labor allocation, wages and real GDP (high trade costs)
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Notes: Figure depicts the results of counterfactual simulations on the effects of reductions in robot prices on robot use per worker in the robotized sector (upper-left
panel), number of workers in the robotized sector (lower-left panel), real wages (upper-right panel) and real GDP (lower-right panel), assuming that trade costs
are twice as high as in the baseline simulation. The long-dashed line refers to the representative higher-income country in the North, the thick line refers to the
South, while the short-dashed line refers to other lower-income Northern countries.
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Table A1: Industry classification
Label IFR EU KLEMS BACI and TRAINS
Agriculture A A 111-322
Mining C B 510-990
Food Products 10-12 10-12 1010-1200
Textiles 13-15 13-15 1311-1520
Wood, paper, printing 16, 17-18 16-18 1610-1629, 1701-1820
Chemicals 19-21 19-21 1910-2100
Rubber and plastics 22, 229, 23 22-23 2211-2200, 2310-2399
Metal 24, 25 24-25 2410-2432, 2511-2599
Electronics 260-268, 271-275, 279 26-27 2610-2680, 2710-2790
Machinery 28, 289 28 2811-2829
Automotive 291-292, 2931-2934, 2939, 2999, 299, 30 29-30 2910-2930, 3011-3099
Other manufacturing 91 31-33 3100-3320
Utilities E D-E 3510-3900
Construction F F 4100-4390
Education P P 8510-8550
Other non-manufact. 90 45-47, 49-53, I, 58-63, K, L, M-N, O, Q, R, S, T, U 4510-8430, 8610-9900
Notes: Table reports the industry classification used in the analysis, as well as the corresponding codes in the IFR, EU KLEMS, BACI and TRAINS data sets. BACI
and TRAINS are mapped from HS6 product codes to ISIC4 industry codes.
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Table A2: Summary statistics, estimation sample, 1995-2015
Mean St. Dev. Observations
(1) (2) (3)
log (1 + exp) 3.8384 3.9886 888,813
log (1 + imp) 2.4173 3.5929 888,813
log(1 + robotshours ) 0.6211 0.8918 888,813
log(1 + obs.robotshours ) 0.7041 0.9813 888,813
Initial GDPpc 26791.2044 12687.1355 888,813
Replaceability 0.3397 0.1903 888,813
Global robot stock 17543.7724 11664.1515 888,813
log (1 + material inputs) 0.1400 0.3013 888,813
log (1 + IT capital) 0.0011 0.0057 888,813
log (1 + non-IT capital) 0.0010 0.0042 888,813
log (1 + tariff) 0.0102 0.1287 888,813
Notes: Table reports mens and standard deviations of the baseline estimation
sample for the period 1995-2015.
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Table A3: Long differences: 5-year intervals
OLS IV
Dependent variable: log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(1+imp1+exp ) log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(
1+imp
1+exp )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(1 + robotshours ) 0.1466* 0.3796*** -0.2329*** 0.7252*** 1.3597*** -0.6345***
(0.0793) (0.1273) (0.0624) (0.2217) (0.3390) (0.1938)
First stage:
Replaceability * initial GDPpc * global robot stock 0.0041*** 0.0041*** 0.0041***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Observations 204,656 204,656 204,656 204,656 204,656 204,656
R2 0.6361 0.7762 0.3935 0.6307 0.7634 0.3896
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 88.479 88.479 88.479
Importer-exporter-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table reports OLS and IV results of equation (23) in text, using data on 5-year intervals from the baseline estimation sample. Columns (1)-(3) report the OLS
results, while columns (4)-(6) report the IV and corresponding first stage estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by developed country are presented in parentheses.
***1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table A4: Alternative robotization measure
OLS IV
Dependent variable: log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(1+imp1+exp ) log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(
1+imp
1+exp )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(1 + obs.robotshours ) 0.1387** 0.3854*** -0.2467*** 0.5679*** 1.0943*** -0.5264***
(0.0669) (0.1180) (0.0646) (0.1960) (0.2843) (0.1392)
First stage :
Replaceability * initial GDPpc * global robot stock 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0030***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813
R2 0.6351 0.7739 0.3913 0.6313 0.7656 0.3890
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald-F-stat 115.912 115.912 115.912
Importer-exporter-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table reports OLS and IV results of equation (23) in text, using the baseline estimation sample and an alternative robotization measure (the observed stock of
robots, ignoring depreciation). Columns (1)-(3) report the OLS results, while columns (4)-(6) report the IV and corresponding first stage estimates. Robust standard
errors clustered by developed country are presented in parentheses. ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table A5: Excluding outliers: robotization and dependent variables censored
OLS IV
Dependent variable: log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(1+imp1+exp ) log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(
1+imp
1+exp )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(1 + robotshours ) 0.1771** 0.4384*** -0.2725*** 0.5830** 1.1704*** -0.5942***
(0.0738) (0.1327) (0.0720) (0.2173) (0.3223) (0.1370)
First stage :
Replaceability * initial GDPpc * global robot stock 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Observations 870,826 871,295 870,942 870,826 871,295 870,942
R2 0.6205 0.7624 0.4095 0.6179 0.7559 0.4070
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald-F-stat 129.528 128.008 128.850
importer-exporter-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table reports OLS and IV results of equation (23) in text, excluding outliers from the baseline estimation sample (robotization and dependent variables censored).
Columns (1)-(3) report the OLS results, while columns (4)-(6) report the IV and corresponding first stage estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by developed
country are presented in parentheses. ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table A6: Using the inverse hyperbolic sine to account for zeros
OLS IV
Dependent variable: sinh−1(imp) sinh−1(exp) sinh−1(imp)− sinh−1(imp) sinh−1(exp) sinh−1(imp)−
sinh−1(exp) sinh−1(exp)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
sinh−1( robotshours ) 0.1431** 0.3479*** -0.2048*** 0.5236*** 0.9625*** -0.4389***
(0.0621) (0.1044) (0.0560) (0.1827) (0.2513) (0.1236)
First stage :
Replaceability * init. GDPpc * global robot stock 0.0035*** 0.0035*** 0.0035***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813
R2 0.6382 0.7753 0.3868 0.6349 0.7683 0.3850
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald-F-stat 109.622 109.622 109.622
importer-exporter-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table reports OLS and IV results of equation (23) in text, using the inverse hyperbolic sine to account for zeros in the regression variables. Columns (1)-(3) report
the OLS results, while columns (4)-(6) report the IV and corresponding first stage estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by developed country are presented in
parentheses. ***1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table A7: Importer-industry fixed effects
OLS IV
Dependent variable: log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(1+imp1+exp ) log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(
1+imp
1+exp )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(1 + robotshours ) 0.1394*** 0.1357*** 0.0037 0.6602*** 0.9469*** -0.2868**
(0.0271) (0.0283) (0.0134) (0.1675) (0.1960) (0.1101)
First stage:
Replaceability * initial GDPpc * global robot stock 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813
R2 0.6575 0.8115 0.4214 0.6557 0.8079 0.4206
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 29.585 29.585 29.585
Importer-exporter-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Importer-industry effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table reports OLS and IV results of equation (23) in text, using data on 5-year intervals from the baseline estimation sample. Columns (1)-(3) report the OLS
results, while columns (4)-(6) report the IV and corresponding first stage estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by developed country are presented in parentheses.
***1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table A8: Removing robots trade flows: full sample
OLS IV
Dependent variable: log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(1+imp1+exp ) log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(
1+imp
1+exp )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(1 + robotshours ) 0.1534** 0.4117*** -0.2583*** 0.6144*** 1.1839*** -0.5695***
(0.0690) (0.1238) (0.0684) (0.2156) (0.3146) (0.1529)
First stage:
Replaceability * initial GDPpc * global robot stock 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813 888,813
R2 0.6351 0.7738 0.3912 0.6314 0.7655 0.3887
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 111.795 111.795 111.795
Importer-exporter-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table reports OLS and IV results of equation (23) in text, using data on 5-year intervals from the baseline estimation sample. Columns (1)-(3) report the OLS
results, while columns (4)-(6) report the IV and corresponding first stage estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by developed country are presented in parentheses.
***1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table A9: Removing robots trade flows: post 2002
OLS IV
Dependent variable: log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(1+imp1+exp ) log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(
1+imp
1+exp )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(1 + robotshours ) 0.1828** 0.4610*** -0.2782*** 0.6354*** 1.2252*** -0.5897***
(0.0678) (0.1234) (0.0718) (0.2119) (0.3122) (0.1539)
First stage:
Replaceability * initial GDPpc * global robot stock 0.0028*** 0.0028*** 0.0028***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Observations 712,283 712,283 712,283 712,283 712,283 712,283
R2 0.6361 0.7701 0.3846 0.6322 0.7611 0.3819
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 119.328 119.328 119.328
Importer-exporter-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table reports OLS and IV results of equation (23) in text, using data on 5-year intervals from the baseline estimation sample. Columns (1)-(3) report the OLS
results, while columns (4)-(6) report the IV and corresponding first stage estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by developed country are presented in parentheses.
***1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table A10: Removing machinery trade flows
OLS IV
Dependent variable: log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(1+imp1+exp ) log(1 + imp) log(1 + exp) log(
1+imp
1+exp )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(1 + robotshours ) 0.1414* 0.3949*** -0.2535*** 0.5922** 1.1284*** -0.5362***
(0.0709) (0.1266) (0.0676) (0.2161) (0.3192) (0.1560)
First stage:
Replaceability * initial GDPpc * global robot stock 0.0027*** 0.0027*** 0.0027***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Observations 833,583 833,583 833,583 833,583 833,583 833,583
R2 0.6259 0.7655 0.3743 0.6223 0.7577 0.3722
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-stat 118.438 118.438 118.438
Importer-exporter-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industry-year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Table reports OLS and IV results of equation (23) in text, using data on 5-year intervals from the baseline estimation sample. Columns (1)-(3) report the OLS
results, while columns (4)-(6) report the IV and corresponding first stage estimates. Robust standard errors clustered by developed country are presented in parentheses.
***1% level, **5% level, *10% level.
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Table A11: Initial factor prices and other calibrated parameters
Initial wage in South 5.70
Initial wage in Other 26.7
Initial wage in North 39.5
Initial rental rate of robots 59.0
θ 5.00
ν 9.00
sector X sector Y sector NT
South 0.48 0.31 0.00
αm,iM Other 0.34 0.23 0.00
North 0.34 0.21 0.00
South 0.20 0.30 0.26
αm,iT Other 0.38 0.45 0.41
North 0.36 0.49 0.40
South 0.20 0.47 0.33
γm,i Other 0.10 0.49 0.42
North 0.13 0.59 0.28
Notes: Initial wages are calibrated with data on per capita GDP and expressed in




wR = 59. The
parameters θ and ν govern the trade elasticity and the elasticity of substitution
between robots and workers, respectively. The Cobb-Douglas share parameters are
calibrated using WIOD data.
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